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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Theories of criminalisation seek to identify the criteria by which 
behaviour is legitimately criminalised. This article believes that their 
success in so doing is best assessed if they examine the question of 
criminalisation in light of four desirable features for any such theory. 
These desirable features, which this article will term desiderata for short, 
are as follows: 
 
 Desideratum 1: a theory of criminalisation should offer an 
evaluative framework that justifies the form of legal regulation 
known as the criminal law. 
 Desideratum 2: a theory of criminalisation’s evaluative framework 
under Desideratum 1 should allow for a coherent and defensible 
account of the criminal law as morally censorious, thereby 
articulating something distinctive about the criminal law as a form 
of legal regulation. 
 Desideratum 3: a theory of criminalisation should display a 
coherent understanding of how its evaluative framework under 
Desideratum 1 integrates with a theoretical account of the 
purpose, and legitimacy, of the state.  
 Desideratum 4: a theory of criminalisation’s evaluative framework 
under Desideratum 1 should distil criminal from non-criminal 
behaviour in a principled and defensible way.  
 
Given that the defence of each desideratum would arguably generate an 
article apiece, the aims of this article are consequently more modest. It is 
aimed at those who already accept one or more of them. It will 
demonstrate the success, in satisfying the desiderata, of a theory of 
criminalisation embedded in the notion of public goods. It shall call this 
theory the public goods account (the ‘PGA’). The PGA is not an entirely 
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new theory, as elements of it can be found in the writings of a number of 
theorists.1 However, by expanding on, exploring and assessing these 
elements in light of the desiderata, this article offers further support to a 
theory of criminal law embedded in the notion of public goods.  
In order to understand the PGA, it is necessary to begin this article 
with a section outlining the nature of public goods. Subsequent sections 
will then address how the PGA satisfies each desideratum, in the order 
they are set out above.  
 
2. THE NATURE OF PUBLIC GOODS 
 
In order to understand the nature of public goods, it is first necessary 
to understand the nature of a good. A good is a defined instance of the 
exercise of valuable autonomy that manifests itself in a particular moral, 
political, social or economic context.2 Individual goods are those when 
only one person exercises the relevant form of valuable autonomy: 
examples include eating and sleeping. Shared goods are when the exercise 
of valuable autonomy requires two or more people to cooperate: team 
sports and many forms of sexual activity are examples. Finally, an 
important feature of goods is that their autonomy component requires that 
the good be freely chosen.  
Turning attention to the concept of a public good, Joseph Raz has 
provided the following definition: 
 
[A good] that refers not to the sum of the good of individuals but 
to those goods which, in a certain community, serve the interest of 
                                                     
1 See, for example: J Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, 
OUP 2016) Chapter 3 ‘Criminal Law Values’ and ‘Bribery as a Form of Criminal 
Wrongdoing’ (2011) 127 LQR 37; J Gardner and S Shute, ‘The Wrongness of 
Rape’ in Jeremy Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Fourth Series 
(OUP 1998); reprinted with minor changes in Gardner, Offences and Defences: 
Selected Essays in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law (OUP 2007) 1, 31; AP 
Simester and A von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (Hart Publishing 2011) 42-43.  
2 As such they may require social forms to exist, see J Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986) 309-312. See also Raz, Ethics in the Public 
Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Clarendon Press 1994) 121. 
This is the notion of valuable autonomy being dependent on social forms that 
give that autonomy meaning. For reasons of space, this claim cannot be 
interrogated here. 
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people generally in a conflict-free, non-exclusive, and non-
excludable way.3 
 
As Raz states, public goods possess the following characteristics: non-
competitiveness, that is to say that one person’s enjoyment of the public 
good does not diminish that of others, though different persons will 
benefit to a different degree, and non-excludability, that is to say the 
public good is available to all, and benefits all, without exclusion.4 Thus, 
for example, the systematic provision of clean air is a public good, as the 
benefits of clean air are then enjoyed by all, and one person enjoying the 
fruits of clean air does not diminish its availability to others.5 
Having outlined the nature of, on the one hand, individual and shared 
goods and, on the other, public goods, the connection between them can 
now be articulated: public goods are constituted by the non-exclusive and 
non-competitive availability, in any given society, of a range of individual 
and shared goods.6 In other words, the ability to exercise the valuable 
autonomy of the relevant individual or shared goods is enjoyed by all 
citizens, that is to say non-rivalrously and without discrimination.7  
                                                     
3 Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 
ibid 52-55, where Raz sets out his theory of public goods. Raz also uses the terms 
“common” and “general” good. See also 122, where Raz states that “… the 
conditions of autonomy … depend on the common good, that is, on a good which 
if available to one is available to all and whose benefits can be had by all without 
competition or conflict.” See also George Klosko, ‘The Principle of Fairness and 
Political Obligation’ (1987) 7 Ethics 353. 
4 Klosko, ibid 353-354; Klosko notes: “[public goods] cannot be enjoyed by 
particular individuals without being made available to a much wider group of 
people, frequently to all members of the community.” Klosko therefore implicitly 
accepts, correctly in the view of this article, that there may be (a few) legitimate 
exclusions from public goods. These include the exclusion of children from the 
franchise and the legal right to enter contracts. Such exclusions must, 
nevertheless, be carefully justified. Perfectionist liberals, such as Raz, might do 
so for reasons different to those committed to impartial liberalism. 
5 Raz, ‘Rights and Politics’ (1995) 71 Indiana Law Journal 27, 35. 
6 Ibid 37: “an adequate range of goods in society is a common good.” 
7 Public goods may well be politically controversial: see Raz, ‘Rights and 
Politics’ (n 5) 38. Iseult Honohan also points out, correctly, that the language of 
common goods can mask political agendas, which suggests the need for political 
scrutiny: see her Civic Republicanism (Routledge 2002) 157. This article accepts 
that rights-based, and public reason type, arguments may be needed to nuance and 
supplement the provision of public goods; for example, the common good of a 
democratic polity benefits all, but, whilst foreign nationals might be legitimately 
excluded from the franchise, exclusions based on race are illegitimate. In this 
regard, see Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (n 1) 49.  
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A distinction should be drawn at this stage between, on the one hand, 
those public goods that are concerned with a single good and, on the 
other, those goods that embrace a wider variety of goods, termed framing 
goods by Raz.8 Public goods concerned with a single good universally 
provide a range of individual and shared goods based on that good and 
that good only. Sexual integrity is an example: it is constituted by the 
systematic availability of a sufficient range of the private and shared 
goods involving sex. Another example is a democratic polity, which 
provides the individual and shared goods that make up a citizen’s 
democratic identity, not least the individual good of the right to vote. By 
way of contrast, Raz has defined framing goods as those ‘…goods the 
existence of which is a precondition for the existence of an adequate range 
of other goods in the society.’9 Framing goods include the public peace, 
which provides for the many different kinds of private and shared goods 
that are themselves dependent on physical and psychic autonomy. The 
public purse is also a framing good: it provides general sustenance for 
valuable autonomy, by financing all the institutions of the state that 
contribute to the valuable autonomy of its citizens. Another example of a 
framing good is a clean environment, which provides a general enabling 
environment for a significant range of individual and shared goods. 
Public goods can be positive or negative.10 They are positive when 
their existence involves the creation, often at public expense, of a 
supportive environment for the exercise of valuable autonomy, such as 
green spaces, secondary education and a democratic polity. They are 
negative when they constitute protection from interferences with 
autonomy, such as a culture of tolerance, the public peace and freedom of 
expression.  
The fact that public goods provide for the systematic protection of 
individual and shared goods might lead some to think that public goods 
have no intrinsic value, but are merely instruments in the provision of 
individual and shared goods. There are two reasons why this is not so, and 
it will emerge in this article that these two reasons are central to the 
PGA’s conception of the nature, justification and limits of the criminal 
law.  
First, public goods have intrinsic value because of their characteristics 
as non-excludable and non-rivalrous. This characteristic means that public 
goods instantiate the notion of making the relevant private and shared 
goods available to all. It is therefore in the nature of public goods that all 
                                                     
8 Raz, ‘Rights and Politics’ (n 5). 
9 Ibid.  
10 As pointed out by Horder, ‘Bribery as a Form of Criminal Wrongdoing’ (n 1) 
44-45. 
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citizens should enjoy the various forms of valuable autonomy made 
available by public goods; consequently, they reflect a fundamental 
commitment to the equality of citizens where the exercise of valuable 
autonomy is concerned. Second, public goods have intrinsic value because 
their contribution to valuable autonomy often transcends the sum of 
individual valuable autonomy they provide and protect. The framing 
goods of the property regime and a democratic polity illustrate this 
capacity.  
The property regime defines and protects those private and shared 
goods required to create the regime, including the shared good of contract. 
However, the economic benefits of the property regime, not least its 
wealth creating capacity, and the opportunities those economic benefits 
create, for example through taxation, transcend the sum of individual good 
each participant derives from the private and shared goods protected by 
the regime. And it is a significant reason why we value the public good of 
the property regime that it possesses these overarching benefits. 
In the same vein, a democratic polity protects those individual and 
shared goods required to create democratic government, including the 
individual good of the right to vote. However, a democratic polity also 
provides a range of benefits that transcend the sum of individual interests 
it protects. For example, it ensures the continued responsiveness of 
government to the wishes of the people and maintains, through inter-party 
competition, the quality of political debate. Thus the quality of the 
political environment is also a concern of a democratic polity, a concern 
that, once successfully realised, benefits all citizens.11  
The above two examples reveal that public goods are valuable not 
only because they provide valuable options to all citizens; they are also 
valuable because, by increasing the impact, benefits and consequences of 
the exercise of valuable autonomy, they enhance the value and effect of 
those options. Public goods are greater than the sum of their parts. This 
overarching quality is evidenced by the fact that both the above public 
goods benefit those who are too young to enter contracts or vote, i.e. are 
ineligible, for legitimate reasons, to exercise the valuable autonomy 
provided by the relevant individual and shared goods.12 It also explains 
the inalienability of the right to vote, since the systematic selling of that 
                                                     
11 This is the quality of dual harmony: see Raz (n 46) and accompanying text in 
this article.  
12 The point concerning children benefiting from the property regime is taken 
from Raz: see Ethics in the Public Domain (n 3) 53-54. On the question of 
legitimate exclusions, see (n 4) and (n 7).  
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
73 
right would undermine the distinctive benefits provided by the public 
good of democratic government.13 
Having expanded on the nature of public goods, attention can now 
turn to how the PGA satisfies the desiderata.  
 
3. THE PGA AND DESIDERATUM 1 
 
Desideratum 1 (‘D1’) states that a theory of criminalisation should 
offer an evaluative framework that justifies the form of legal regulation 
known as the criminal law. Its reference to an evaluative framework 
incorporates explanatory, justificatory and critical strands. By 
explanatory, it means a theory of criminalisation must set out its criteria 
for the criminalisation of behaviour. By justificatory, it means a theory of 
criminalisation must defend those criteria in light of moral and/or political 
values. In other words, why is the criminal law, as that theory conceives 
it, a good thing? Finally, by critical, a theory of criminalisation should 
suggest reform and improvement to existing systems of criminal law, 
whilst possessing a measure of descriptive accuracy where such systems 
are concerned.14 For reasons of space, and because the critical strand of a 
theory of criminalisation flows from its explanatory and justificatory 
strands, this article will focus on the explanatory and justificatory strands.  
 
3.1 The explanatory strand of D1 
 
The PGA is a theory of criminalisation that shares with certain 
theories of criminalisation the notion that wrongfulness, conceived of in 
some way, is an intentional object of criminalisation. And so, in this 
section, the article will set out the PGA’s criteria of criminal 
wrongfulness. Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to expand 
somewhat on the familiar distinction between crimes that are mala in se 
and those that are mala prohibita. Admittedly, the nature of this 
distinction, or even the fact of making it, is controversial. The reason for 
                                                     
13 This point concerning the inalienability of the right to vote and the public good 
of a democratic polity is taken from Raz, ‘Rights and Politics’ (n 5) 34.  
14 The need for theories of criminalisation to have both descriptive and normative 
dimensions has been summarised by R Dagger: see his ‘Republicanism and the 
Foundations of Criminal Law’ in RA Duff and SP Green (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 44, 45, where he states that such 
theories “… must account for the leading features of the criminal law and point 
the way to its reform or further development.” It should be noted that there is a 
risk of a significant gap between, on the one hand, theories of criminalisation and 
their account of the rules and principles of the criminal law and, on the other, the 
implementation of those rules and principles in actual practice.   
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offering an explanation will become clear: the distinction, as this article 
conceives it, serves as a necessary backdrop to the PGA’s account of 
criminalisation.15    
Moral wrongs are determinations that certain behaviour should not be 
performed in light of the moral reasons for and against that behaviour in 
any given context. On occasion the wrongs that emerge from such 
determinations will admit of relatively little disagreement as to their form: 
it is the crimes that seek to reflect such wrongs that are mala in se. It is for 
this reason that, when they accurately reflect their source morality, mala 
in se crimes such as murder and rape take much the same form across 
jurisdictions. It is the precision of the source morality where such crimes 
are concerned that accounts for their conventional definition as wrongful 
independent of law: in such cases, the criminal law is, to a significant 
degree, simply a formally posited definition of what morality already 
articulates. 
By way of contrast, mala prohibita crimes are concerned with those 
occasions when the morality from which the criminal wrong is derived is 
considerably more ambiguous. The reason for such ambiguity lies in the 
highly abstract nature of certain moral objectives, of which perhaps the 
most pervasive example is the objective to make the world a safer place. 
How abstract moral objectives of this nature are particularised in the 
context of complex projects of social and economic coordination admits 
of enormous variety in matters of detail. For this reason, a number of 
different definitions of any derivative criminal wrong will do justice to the 
source morality. Yet the principle of maximum certainty in the criminal 
law requires that a line be drawn somewhere: where exactly may be 
somewhat arbitrary or governed by local contingencies. Because the line 
between what is and is not criminal therefore depends largely on what the 
law says, as opposed to being governed by fidelity to an underlying 
morality, what is prohibited remains ‘unknown’ until a definition is 
supplied by the criminal law.16  It is this fact that accounts for the 
conventional definition of mala prohibita crimes as wrong only because 
                                                     
15 For an excellent exploration of the nature of this distinction, see the trilogy of 
papers (special topic) published in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 
(2016) 55 (1), as follows: S Dimock, ‘A Trilogy of Papers on the Malum 
prohibitum-Malum in se Distinction in Criminal Law: Introduction’ 1; S Dimock, 
‘The Malum prohibitum-Malum in se Distinction and the Wrongfulness 
Constraint on Criminalization’ 9; SP Green, ‘The Conceptual Utility of Malum 
prohibitum’ 33; C Flanders, ‘Public Wrongs and Public Reason’ 45.  See also 
Simester and von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (n 1) 24-29. 
16 Or the criminal law in conjunction with the civil law. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
75 
the law says so. Such crimes are therefore prohibita to the extent their 
final formulation could legitimately have taken different forms. However, 
they are mala to the extent that they do justice to their underlying moral 
objective. So no crime can be mala by dint of prohibition alone.17  
It is important to note that this article conceives of the difference 
between mala in se and mala prohibita as one of degree, rather than one 
of kind.18 This is because even those criminal wrongs conventionally seen 
as reflecting mala in se admit of some measure of reasonable discretion in 
the exact form they take. This may be due to reasonable differences in 
conceptions of the underlying morality or it can flow, as will be argued 
later in the article, from how the criminal law puts its legitimate political 
goals into effect.19 For example, whether only certain, or alternatively all, 
frauds in the inducement are constitutive of the wrong of rape, is a 
controversy within morality.20 When the criminal law settles on which 
frauds in the inducement to include and exclude, and for what reasons 
(moral, political or a mixture of both),21 it is making a choice that 
accounts for a measure of prohibita where the crime of rape is concerned. 
What prohibita therefore means in the context of criminalisation is 
discretion as to form when, in light of the relevant source morality, a 
crime can take more than one legitimate form.22 
                                                     
17 As Simester and von Hirsch point out, the state cannot make something wrong 
simply by declaring it so: see Simester and von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and 
Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation (n 1) 24-27. 
18 This insight is taken from Green (n 15). 
19 Duff makes a similar point: see his Punishment, Communication and 
Community (OUP 2001) 64-67. 
20 For a conception of rape that conceives of the wrong as a violation of self-
possession, as opposed to sexual autonomy, and the implications of this 
conception for the criminalisation of frauds in the inducement, see J Rubenfeld, 
‘The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy’ (2013) 
122 Yale Law Journal 1372. 
21 See the difference in opinion between Jonathan Herring and Hyman Gross 
played out in the following articles: Herring, ‘Mistaken Sex’ [2005] Crim LR 
511, Gross, ‘Rape, Moralism and Human Rights’ [2007] Crim LR 220 and 
Herring, ‘Human Rights and Rape: A Reply to Hyman Gross’ (2007) Crim LR 
228. 
22 It should be noted that, despite the fact that such lines can be reasonably drawn 
in different places where such crimes are concerned, their source morality means 
some places where those lines are drawn are, as Douglas Husak points out, 
indefensible: see his Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP 
2008) 110. See also Dimock ‘Contractarian Criminal Law Theory and Mala 
Prohibita Offences’ in Duff, L Farmer, SE Marshall, M Renzo and V Tadros 
(eds), Criminalisation: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (OUP 2014) 
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In light of the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita 
crimes as outlined above, the explanation of how the PGA identifies 
criminal wrongs can begin with those crimes that most saliently embody a 
concern with public goods, those that, as Duff expresses it, “wrong or 
harm the polity as a whole, rather than a distinct identifiable individual. 
These include such serious crimes against collective, shared goods as 
treason and attempting to pervert the course of justice; tax evasion [and] 
‘public nuisance’”.23 These crimes, which shall be termed public crimes 
for short, can be found at various points along the spectrum between mala 
in se and mala prohibita. According to the PGA, they are united by the 
fact that the criminal prohibition seeks to maintain one or more public 
goods, for example the environment, the public purse or health and safety.  
For those public crimes closer to the mala prohibita end of the 
spectrum, wrongfulness is governed predominantly by the fact that the 
individual and/or systematic commission of the crime reduces the 
availability of the particular form(s) of valuable autonomy provided, 
directly or indirectly, by the public good(s) concerned. Such crimes are 
mala in se to the extent that they constitute reasonable and carefully 
considered attempts to target behaviour that directly or indirectly, in 
isolation or cumulatively, sets back the provision of the valuable 
autonomy. But they are largely prohibita because the manner in which 
autonomy is protected in particular contexts, for example food, drug or 
road safety, admits of much discretion. This category accounts for those 
crimes of a regulatory nature, often strict and met with milder punishment, 
that are designed, in a fairly instrumental way, to maintain autonomy in 
given contexts, such as health and safety and the transport system.  
However, public goods are not exclusively concerned with the 
provision of autonomy per se: rather, they articulate and protect 
environments where the exercise of autonomy has moral value and 
significance. It is for this reason that they are characterised by a number of 
moral principles. For example, all public goods associated with the public 
good of the rule of law, such as the public purse and the systems of civil 
and criminal justice, are characterised by the notions of fairness, 
objectivity, honesty and integrity. In turn, for those public crimes closer to 
the mala in se end of the spectrum, the wrongfulness of the behaviour 
flows from the fact it violates the moral principles that characterise the 
                                                                                                                        
151, 175: ‘… not all ways of providing determinate content to mala in se wrongs 
are acceptable.’ 
23 Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law 
(Hart Publishing 2007) 140. Duff is expressing this notion within the context of 
what it means for a wrong to be public, for the sake of his ‘public wrong’ account 
of criminalisation: see (n 52).   
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public good and make the existence of the public good valuable. 
Alternatively, such mala in se crimes violate the moral principles that 
assist in the provision of the valuable autonomy characteristic of the 
public good.  
Let us take, for example, public crimes that target tax evasion. Such 
crimes are designed to sustain the public purse. Of course, these are mala 
prohibita to the extent that their reach is dependent on the contingencies 
of how the targets, and levels, of taxation are decided within any given 
jurisdiction. But the public purse is more than simply the methodological 
notion of money gathered through taxes: it is characterised by a number of 
moral principles. These include fairness in distribution and the presence of 
honesty and integrity in those public officials tasked with gathering and 
spending the sums raised through taxation; the latter requires that tax is 
gathered for, and spent on, the business of government, not syphoned 
away for personal advantage. Offences that are designed to maintain the 
public purse will therefore be mala in se to the extent that they constitute 
violations of these moral principles. For example, when the burden of 
taxation is justly distributed, tax evasion is rightly characterised as 
wrongful, as a form of cheating and free riding. In the same vein, some 
instances of the electoral offence of personation, that is voting as another 
person, violate the democratic principle of ‘one-person, one vote’, which 
is itself derived from the principle of political equality.24 Thus the 
wrongfulness of (some forms of) personation is constituted by the 
violation of important values that constitute the public good of a 
democratic polity.  
However, as will be defended in greater detail in the next subsection, 
what completes the case for the criminalisation of these more mala in se 
public crimes, as well as their more mala prohibita cousins, is the 
damaging impact their systematic commission would have on the various 
forms of valuable autonomy provided by the relevant public good. This 
impact can take different forms. Where positive public goods are 
concerned, it may take the form of a reduction in the means by which the 
state creates a supportive environment for valuable autonomy. For 
example, though a single instance of tax evasion may have no practical 
effect on the public purse in its capacity as a framing good, systematic tax 
evasion does. This is because the consequent loss of funds to the state will 
reduce its capacity to provide numerous public goods, such as the public 
                                                     
24 For a defence of this argument, see J Slater and b Watt, ‘In Defence of 
Democracy: The Criminalization of Impersonation’ (2015) 14(2) Election Law 
Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 165.  
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peace and secondary education.25 Alternatively, systematic commission of 
the offence may undermine the overarching benefits of a public good, 
thereby eroding the valuable nature of the autonomy it provides. To 
illustrate, though a single instance of personation may not alter an election 
result, systematic personation will eventually erode the provision of the 
valuable autonomy characteristic of a democratic polity. It will do so 
principally by undermining the overarching benefits of a democratic 
polity, such as the confidence of the electorate in the electoral system and 
the responsiveness of political parties, and government, to the wishes of 
the people.26   
On the other hand, the relationship between public goods and mala in 
se crimes such as murder, theft and rape, which are wrongs against 
individuals as opposed to the public, seems less obvious. The PGA’s 
concern with public goods suggests the individual does not feature in the 
PGA’s account of criminalisation, and, consequently, that it would 
struggle to give a satisfactory account of such crimes. The nature of this 
(potential) flaw is outlined by Duff:  
 
If we are going to say that such actions as murder, rape and theft 
should be criminal because they injure or threaten some common 
good, are we not then ignoring, and thus denigrating, the wrong 
done to the individual victims of such actions-a wrong which 
surely should be central to the law’s concerns?27 
 
                                                     
25 Green points out that it is in the nature of tax evasion that it is ’significant only 
in aggregate’: see his ‘What is Wrong with Tax Evasion?’ (2009) Houston 
Business and Tax Law Journal 220, 226. 
26 See Slater and Watt, ‘In Defence of Democracy: The Criminalisation of 
Impersonation’ (n 24). 
27 Marshall and Duff, ‘Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs’ (1998) 11 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 7, 12. Similarly in Answering for Crime (n 23) 
141, Duff states: “If we … argue that such mala in se as murder and rape count as 
public wrongs only because they too have a harmful or wrongful impact on ‘the 
public’, as well as on their individual victims, we are likely to distort the 
wrongfulness that makes them criminalisable. Even if a rapist takes unfair 
advantage over the law-abiding (which is at best arguable), or creates ‘social 
volatility’ or undermines trust, that is not what is central to the criminal 
wrongfulness of his action; what he is properly convicted and punished for is the 
wrong done to his victim.” This point is a common theme in Duff’s work: see, for 
example, Punishment Communication and Responsibility (n 19) 60 and Public 
and Private Wrongs (again with Marshall) in J Chalmers, F Leverick and Farmer 
(eds) Essays in Criminal Law in Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon (Vol 5 Edinburgh 
Studies in Law, Edinburgh University Press 2010) 71.  
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As Duff explains further, the problem with accounts that exhibit an 
exclusive concern with the public, or common, good, is that they …: 
 
… seem to subordinate the individual victim (a concern for their 
good, or for the wrong done to them) to some supposedly larger 
social good. The offender's conduct is counted as criminal, and he 
is to be punished, for the sake of that larger good: to which it is 
appropriate to object that his conduct should be criminalised 
because of, and he should be punished for, the wrong he does to 
the individual victim. We do not criminalise rape, and punish 
rapists, because rape causes social volatility; or because the rapist 
takes an unfair advantage over his law-abiding fellow citizens: but 
because of the nature of the wrong that the rapist does to his 
victims.28 
 
Duff is making two closely related claims here. First, he is suggesting that 
theories of criminalisation that justify the criminalisation of wrongs 
against individuals purely in terms of some benefit to the public, for 
example because they suppress social volatility, fall into error by ignoring 
the wrong done to the individual.29 Second, he is suggesting a theory’s 
account of such crimes should be reacting, in some fairly fine-grained 
way, to the moral mala committed against the victim. 
The position of this article is that the first claim is self-evidently true: 
some conception of what happens to the individual must play its part in 
the nature and justification of such crimes. In this section, the article will 
therefore demonstrate how the PGA does not suffer from this flaw. It will 
also address the second claim, by demonstrating how the PGA is 
sufficiently fine grained to respond appropriately to the moral mala 
experienced by the individual. In the next section, which addresses 
Desideratum 2, it will then defend the claim that this is what the criminal 
law should be doing, to the extent that a distinctive, that is to say 
                                                     
28 Marshall and Duff, ‘Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs’ ibid. 
29 Duff’s own ‘public wrong’ account of criminalisation does not fall foul of this 
error. This is because he fuses concern with the moral wrong done to the 
individual with the quality of publicness, by arguing that the moral values that 
define the behaviour as wrong where the individual is concerned are, 
simultaneously, part of the fabric of shared values that define the political 
community: see his ‘Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs’ (n 27) 20, where Duff 
states: “ … wrongs against individual citizens can be understood as shared 
wrongs, as wrongs against the whole community, insofar as the individual goods 
which are attacked are goods in terms of which the community identifies and 
understands itself.” 
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censorious, account of the criminal law is not possible without so 
responding.  
With regard to the first claim, the reason why the maintenance of 
public goods does not ignore the individual in the name of a distinct social 
goal is because creating and/or maintaining a public good frequently 
involves directly protecting the capacity of individual citizens to enjoy the 
valuable autonomy of various individual and shared goods. The public 
goods of the public peace and the property regime illustrate this.  
The public peace is a public good because it assists all members of 
society in partaking in a wide range of individual and shared goods, by 
freeing them of physical interference and violence, and one member of 
society benefiting from the public peace does not diminish its availability 
to other members.30 However, it can only be provided by systematically 
protecting individual members of society from physical and psychic 
assault; in other words, it is through the protection of the individual goods 
of bodily and psychic integrity, in the form of fatal and non-fatal offences 
against the person, that the public good is created. The core of the 
criminal wrong therefore consists of the invasion of the valuable 
autonomy of the individual. 
The property regime is a public good because it provides, for all 
citizens, “… opportunities for personal and social advancement through 
reliable coordinated economic activity, and for other forms of welfare and 
personal realisation that only the peaceful ownership and possession of 
property can deliver.”31 The foundation of peaceful ownership and 
possession of property, along with its resulting benefits, is individual 
dominium over assets, with the nature of that individual dominium, and 
how it can be shared and exchanged, largely defined by the civil law. In 
turn, for the public good of the property regime to materialise, that system 
of individual dominium must also be protected. This is why the crime of 
theft, along with other property offences, target all those who seek to 
ignore or violate the rules of individual ownership, possession and 
transfer.  
The above two examples reveal that, where certain public goods are 
concerned, there is a symbiotic relationship between, on the one hand, the 
systematic protection of the valuable autonomy of individuals and, on the 
other, the maintenance of the relevant public good. This symbiosis means 
that, where wrongs against individuals are concerned, the PGA conceives 
of the criminal law as possessing what Blackstone termed a ‘double 
view’: an interest in both protecting the individual’s valuable autonomy 
                                                     
30 Horder, ‘Bribery as a Form of Criminal Wrongdoing’ (n 1) 44. 
31 See Simester and von Hirsch Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles 
of Criminalisation (n 1) 42. 
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and protecting the public.32 It is this ‘double view’ that means the PGA 
does not ignore the individual in the name of a distinct public good, 
because concern with the valuable autonomy of the individual is the 
fundamental building block of the public good. The PGA then simply 
demands that that protection be offered systematically to all, such that a 
distinct, non-rivalrous and non-excludable good is created.  
As for the nature of the wrong done to the individual, does the PGA 
have the capacity to articulate the moral mala experienced by the 
individual? The answer is yes and flows, as with public crimes, from the 
fact that public goods are characterised by a number of moral principles 
that mean the autonomy they foster and protect is valuable in nature.  
For example, the public peace is more than the existence of freedom 
from physical and psychic attack. It concerned with the human dignity of 
each citizen and the public’s conception of their security and social 
environment. This concern with human dignity means it is interested in 
marking the difference between, say, murder, a deliberate attack, and 
gross negligent manslaughter, a morally culpable failure to meet a 
standard of conduct. It also accounts, it is suggested, for offences against 
the person defined in part by racial or religious animus. These various 
wrongs threaten the public peace in different ways: proclaiming them as 
crimes, and prosecuting in their name, gives the public peace its value, its 
moral character.33  
This moral articulacy is also illustrated by sexual offences. There is a 
public good in the form of sexual integrity, a general sphere of valuable 
autonomy made up of the universal availability of various forms of human 
flourishing constituted by private and shared goods involving sex.34 Craig 
has listed these various forms of flourishing as follows:  
                                                     
32 Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press 1769) Book IV, Ch 1, 
7: “Upon the whole we may observe that in taking cognizance of all wrongs, or 
unlawful acts, the law has a double view: viz. not only to redress the party injured 
… but also to secure to the public the benefit of society, by preventing or 
punishing every breach and violation of those laws, which the sovereign power 
has thought proper to establish for the government and tranquillity of the whole.” 
See also Book IV, Ch 1, 5: “ … every public offence is also a private wrong, and 
somewhat more; it affects the individual, and it likewise affects the community.” 
33 Where racial or religious animus is concerned, see, for example, the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, sections 29 and 32. Fair labelling is therefore not just a 
concern for the accused: because of the interest of all citizens in the relevant 
public good, it is a concern for all citizens.  
34 The article will not address whether and, if so, in what ways, a good is 
dependent on existing social forms and, additionally, grounded in independent 
criteria of value: the aim here is more limited, which is simply to demonstrate 
how the notion of public goods has moral granularity.  
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… not only … freedom from violations of sexual integrity but also 
promoting and protecting the ‘conditions for’ sexual fulfilment, 
sexual diversity, sexual literacy, the safety necessary for sexual 
exploration, the freedom to say ‘yes,’ and the capacity to gain 
sexual benefit (whether that benefit be physical, emotional, 
financial or social).35  
 
These forms of human flourishing are clearly dependent on autonomy per 
se. But the various private and shared goods of sex listed above are also 
morally and socially meaningful, in other words valuable, and sexual 
offences target that value in many different ways. For example, if 
consensual sex is joyful or recreational or an expression of deep love and 
commitment, or all three at the same time, the horror and exploitative 
nature of rape negates these qualities in a particular way. This is worthy of 
discrete articulation by a conception of the criminal law that seeks to 
foster the public good of sexual integrity.   
Finally, the PGA has significant explanatory and evaluative power 
where the concept of criminal recklessness is concerned. Though 
recklessness has a role as a determinant of culpability, the requirement 
that the risk taken is unjustified means it is also concerned with the 
boundary between criminal and non-criminal behaviour. Whether a risk is 
unjustified is a complex socio-moral, that is to say normative, judgment. It 
requires balancing the social utility of taking the risk against the gravity of 
the harm it might cause, as well as its likelihood to cause that harm, with a 
view to establishing whether the risk is worth taking. In other words, 
whether an activity is reckless depends on how that conclusion integrates 
with the promotion of valuable autonomy generally, the net gain in 
valuable autonomy from the toleration of risk. Because the raison d’être 
of the PGA is the promotion valuable autonomy, rather than autonomy per 
se, it provides a normative context that engages directly with how those 
risks are assessed and tolerated.  
 
3.2 The justificatory strand of D1 
 
The justificatory strand of D1 is concerned with the question why the 
decision to criminalise behaviour is a good thing. The PGA sees this 
justification in the criminal law’s impact on practical reason, with the 
result that citizens desist or are deterred from committing criminal 
wrongs, with a view to creating and/or maintaining public goods. This 
                                                     
35 E Craig, Troubling Sex: Towards a Legal Theory of Sexual Integrity (UBC 
Press 2012) 136. 
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justification of the criminal law is derived from Raz’s conception of the 
purpose, and legitimacy, of the state. This purpose is to create, through 
law and other measures, the social conditions under which citizens can 
lead autonomous lives, through the provision of a sufficient range of 
individual and shared goods. The PGA’s theory of criminalisation is 
therefore embedded in, rather than independent of, a political theory of the 
state.36 The reasons for criminalisation are fundamentally political in 
nature. The implications of this approach for the definitions of criminal 
wrongs and the rules of attribution will be examined in Section 5, when 
this article explores the implications of the PGA’s political approach to 
the criminal law. This section will address why such an approach justifies 
the criminal law, as the PGA sees it.   
The support for autonomy within this conception of the state’s role is 
perfectionist in nature: this means that personal autonomy is worthy of 
state support only to the extent that it is exercised in favour of valuable 
options.37 Raz explains:  
 
…the autonomy principle is a perfectionist principle. Autonomous 
life is valuable only if it is spent in the pursuit of acceptable and 
valuable projects and relationships. The autonomy principle 
permits and even requires governments to create morally valuable 
opportunities …38 
                                                     
36 For a discussion of the whether the starting points of a theory of criminalisation 
should be political or moral, see Duff et al, Criminalization: The Political 
Morality of the Criminal Law (n 22) 17-26. 
37 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (n 2) Ch 15, ‘Freedom and Autonomy’. For a 
critical analysis of Raz’s perfectionist liberalism, see P Neal, ‘Perfectionism with 
a Liberal Face? Nervous Liberals and Raz's Political Theory’ (1994) 20 Social 
Theory and Practice 25. 
38 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (n 2) 417; see also 133, where Raz states: “… it 
is the goal of all political action to enable individuals to pursue valid conceptions 
of the good …” Raz also believes that the state is under a duty to discourage or 
eliminate empty or evil options, as these quotes go on to state. According to Raz, 
there are no barriers, in principle, preventing the state from targeting worthless 
options through coercion because, according to Raz, there is no value in 
autonomy per se (418). However, he acknowledges both pragmatic and 
contingent objections. The pragmatic objections consist of, first, the possibility of 
error, by government, as to what is valuable (427) and, second, the fact that the 
pursuit of too many perfectionist policies may lead to civil strife (429). The 
contingent objection is that coercion will have a collateral effect on the exercise 
of valuable autonomy (418-419). Contra Raz, this article believes that the 
coercive effect of the criminal law means it should be confined to promoting, and 
protecting, valuable autonomy, as matter of principle. Autonomy per se has 
sufficient value such that the criminal law cannot be used to suppress valueless 
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Additionally, and equally importantly, the state’s support of autonomy 
requires it to provide a wide range of individual and shared goods: it is 
only in the face of a sufficient range of valuable options that the pursuit of 
any given valuable option is freely chosen, that is to say autonomous.39 As 
explained above, the provision of public goods is fundamental to the state 
fulfilling this role because, as Raz states: “Public goods lie at the 
foundation of most options.”40 And so, when the state provides a wide 
range of public goods, this ensures that all citizens have an adequate range 
of individual and shared goods to choose from, which also ensures that the 
goods are chosen freely. Public goods are therefore fundamental to the 
ability of citizens to lead autonomous lives.  
According to the PGA, the criminal law is necessary for the creation 
and maintenance of public goods. This is because, echoing the concept of 
public goods in economic theory, the creation of public goods cannot be 
left exclusively to the ‘market’ of enforcement by aggrieved individuals 
pursuing private law remedies. Such enforcement would not occur 
systematically enough to create the system of deterrence necessary to 
bring public goods into existence. Market failure will result for a number 
of reasons: one is that victims often lack the resources required to mount a 
prosecution; another is that many crimes do not produce individual 
victims in any event. Accordingly, public goods need the systematic 
support from the state, in its capacity as police authority and prosecutor, to 
materialise. Of course, according such a purpose to the criminal law is 
subject to an efficacy condition, that the criminal law will, indeed, be 
effective as a deterrent. 
However, just because autonomous lives cannot exist without the 
criminal law does not address a more fundamental question, which is 
whether the state is justified in using the form of regulation known as the 
criminal law, as the PGA conceives it, to achieve this objective? The 
                                                                                                                        
autonomy, though the state is under no duty to provide it, or protect it, through 
the criminal law, or other measures.  
39 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (n 2) 204, 408, 410, 417-18, 425. See also his 
Ethics in The Public Domain (n 3) 121, where he states: “One is autonomous only 
if one lives in an environment rich with possibilities.” 
40 Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (n 3) 121. See also The Morality of Freedom 
(n 2) 207: “The provision of many collective goods is constitutive of the very 
possibility of autonomy …”. 
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answer is yes, because such a theory engages directly with, first, the state 
administered and, second, the coercive nature of the criminal law.41  
With regard to the fact that the criminal law is a state created and 
administered practice, the criminal law is a resource intensive enterprise.42 
The use of public resources requires a justification that speaks to the 
polity as a whole: the vindication of moral values, though a reason to 
criminalise, cannot justify, by itself, the expense and logistical efforts 
required to put the criminal law into effect. The PGA offers such a reason: 
the creation of valuable autonomy for all, via the means of public goods.   
As for the question of coercion, the criminal law’s transgression 
generates the risk of prosecution and punishment, including the possibility 
of incarceration.43 These risks create prudential, content independent 
reasons to comply that, on occasion, override the preferences of the 
individual concerned, and so are coercive in nature. For some, the bloody-
minded and recalcitrant, such prudential reasons may be the only reasons 
for which they comply.44 Autonomy has sufficient value, even when 
exercised in the name of valueless options, that coercion requires 
justification. Furthermore, the impact on valuable autonomy of a 
conviction, for example its impact on reputation and employability, means 
the criminal law must, overall, have a positive effect on people’s lives in 
order to be justified.45 According to the PGA, it is the maintenance of 
public goods, and the consequential beneficial impact such maintenance 
has on the valuable autonomy of all citizens, so that they may lead 
                                                     
41 Simester and von Hirsch make similar point: see Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs 
(n 1) 118, repeated in ‘On the Legitimate Objectives of Criminalisation’ (2016) 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 367, 376.  
42 As noted by Matravers, ‘Duff on Hard Treatment’ in R Cruft, MH Kramer and 
MR Reiff, Crime, Punishment and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony 
Duff (OUP 2011) 68, 81.  
43 It should be noted that just because a theorist acknowledges that the criminal 
law is coercive does not mean that achieving that coercive effect need feature in 
the theorist’s justification for the criminal law. For example, Michael Moore 
acknowledges that the criminal law is coercive but does not see preventing 
wrongdoing by coercion as justifying its existence. Rather, he argues its raison 
d’être is the imposition of punishment on those who deserve it: culpable moral 
wrongdoers; see Moore, ‘Liberty’s Constraints on What Should be Made 
Criminal’ in Duff et al (eds), Criminalisation: The Political Morality of the 
Criminal Law (n 22) 182, 184. 
44 The expression “bloody minded and recalcitrant” is taken from Scott Anderson, 
‘Coercion’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/> accessed July 2017. 
45 As noted by Simester and von Hirsch in Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs (n 1) 118 
and ‘On the Legitimate Objectives of Criminalisation’ (n 41) 376. 
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autonomous lives, that supplies a justification that engages directly with 
these facts.  
It is also worth remembering the overarching benefits of public goods 
noted under Section 2, because such benefits are a key reason why public 
goods are valuable and thereby worthy of protection. In particular, these 
overarching benefits give rise to what Raz has termed the quality of dual 
harmony, whereby protecting the valuable autonomy of the individual 
creates the common good, and, in return, the common good, brings 
additional benefits to the individual.46 Raz explains dual harmony as 
follows: 
 
…to the extent that the rightholder's interest is given extra weight 
for reasons of the common good, these reasons are not altogether 
detachable from considerations of the rightholder's own interest. 
The common good is the good of all, including the good of the 
rightholder. By serving the common good, the right also serves the 
interest of the rightholder in that common good. There is here 
what I have called elsewhere a dual harmony between the interest 
of the rightholder and the interest of other people which is served 
by his right. The right protects the common good by protecting his 
interest, and it protects his interest by protecting the common 
good.47 
 
An example of dual harmony was touched upon in Section 2, when the 
overarching benefits of the public good of the property regime were 
described. The systematic protection of the individual and shared goods of 
ownership and contract creates the public good of the property regime, the 
existence of which, not least through its capacity for wealth creation, 
benefits the individual in return. It is this dual harmony of public goods 
that is also an integral part of justifying the expensive, autonomy 
impacting form of coercion known as the criminal law.  
 
4. THE PGA AND DESIDERATUM 2 
 
Desideratum 2 (‘D2’) means D1’s evaluative framework includes a 
commitment to a coherent and defensible account of the criminal law as 
morally censorious.48 At the heart of D2 is the notion that the criminal law 
                                                     
46 For an explanation of dual harmony, see Raz’s Ethics in the Public Domain (n 
3) 53-55. 
47 Raz, ‘Rights and Politics’ (n 5) 39. 
48 Of course, if a theorist rejects a distinct account of the criminal law, D2 is an 
irrelevancy.  
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condemns the behaviour it criminalises: a theory’s success in satisfying 
this desideratum will therefore depend on the coherence and defensibility 
of the condemnation it articulates. It also means the theory must not only 
condemn the wrong but also the wrongdoer: it should therefore have some 
conception of the moral culpability of those convicted of criminal wrongs. 
This means it should give an account of attribution. Attribution is 
concerned not with wrongdoing and justification, but rather with whether 
and how people are held to account for their (all things considered) 
wrongdoing.49 Amongst other things, it addresses the nature and reach of 
excusatory and exempting defences such as loss of control and insanity.50 
A conception of the criminal law as condemning both wrong and 
wrongdoer offers a distinctive account of such law in two ways.51 First, it 
seeks to distinguish the criminal law from those forms of legal regulation 
that are not censorious in nature, for example those associated with 
corrective justice, such as tort, or distributive justice, such as taxation. 
Second, and more crucially for the purposes of this article, it may be 
contrasted with non-distinctive accounts of the criminal law itself, which 
lack the element of moral censure.  
The difference between distinctive accounts and non-distinctive ones 
is one of degree. At one end of the spectrum are purely distinctive 
accounts, which propose no other goal for the criminal law than the moral 
                                                     
49 John Gardner describes these elements of the criminal law as addressing 
“whether and how we should count what people have done when we are judging 
them.” Gardner, ‘Criminal Law and the Uses of Theory: A Reply to Laing’ 
(1994) 14 OJLS 217, 220. See also Duff, ‘Harms and Wrongs’ (2001) 5 Buffalo 
Criminal Law Review 13, 19. 
50 Thus, a theory of criminalisation embraces all those elements that govern the 
possibility, and nature, of conviction. This article agrees with Simester and von 
Hirsch that the grounds of criminalisation need not perfectly match those of 
punishment: see Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (n 1) 8. See also JR Edwards and Simester, ‘Prevention with a 
Moral Voice’ in A du Bois Pedain and U Neuman (eds) Liberal Criminal Law 
Theory: Essays for Andreas von Hirsch (Hart Publishing 2016) 43, 47: “There is 
no reason to think that the legitimate aims of criminalisation and punishment 
must be identical.” 
51 For a summary of the nature of a distinctive account of the criminal law, see M 
Matravers, ‘Political Neutrality and Punishment’ (2013) 7 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 217, 219-223. See also A Cornford ‘Rethinking the Wrongness 
Constraint on Criminalisation’ (2017) Law and Philosophy 1, 2-3 and P Pettit, 
‘Criminalization in Republican Theory’ in Duff, Farmer, Marshall, Renzo and 
Tadros (eds), Criminalization: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (n 22) 
132, 135.  
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condemnation of those who commit crimes.52 Such theories reject any 
deterrent and preventative role for the criminal law.53 At the other end of 
the spectrum, purely non-distinctive accounts reject concern with moral 
condemnation. Purely non-distinctive accounts are characterised by two 
aspirations: first, to conceive of the criminal wrong in as morally 
parsimonious fashion as possible, for example that behaviour is criminally 
wrongful simply because it is harmful or autonomy reducing; second, to 
see the criminal law is nothing more than a regulatory tool designed to 
reduce offending through the provision of prudential reasons to comply, in 
the form of fear of conviction and punishment.54 And some accounts find 
                                                     
52 The legal moralism of Moore and Duff are examples of purely distinctive 
accounts. For Moore, the purpose of the criminal law is to identify those who 
should receive ‘deserved’ punishment for moral wrongdoing: see his Placing 
Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law (OUP 1997) and ‘Liberty’s 
Constraints’ (n 43). For Duff, the criminal law should be exclusively concerned 
with the communication of censure, both to the public at large and the criminal 
convicted, when public, as opposed to private, wrongs have been committed: 
“[W]e should not see the criminal law as prohibiting the conduct that it defines as 
mala in se—as offering the citizens content-independent reasons to refrain from 
such conduct. We should see it instead as declaring such conduct to constitute a 
public wrong properly condemned by the community, for which the agent is 
answerable to the community through a criminal process.” See his Punishment, 
Communication and Community (OUP 2001) 64. This approach is a central pillar 
of Duff’s conception of the criminal law: see, e.g., Answering for Crime (n 27) 
84-93 and ‘Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law’ in Philosophical 
Foundations of Criminal Law (n 14) 125, 129. For an excellent summary of 
Duff’s philosophy, see M Thorburn, ‘Calling Antony Duff to Account’ (2015) 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 737. 
53 Duff’s rejection of deterrence flows from his commitment to the notion that the 
criminal law should display respect for persons, with the result that the provision 
of content independent reasons (the fear of sanction and punishment) is not a 
legitimate feature of the criminal law. Matravers has stated that Duff “… recoils 
at the slightest hint of deterrence”: see ‘Duff on Hard Treatment’ in The 
Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (n 42) 81. For an analysis of Duff’s approach, see 
Matravers, Justice and Punishment: The Rationale of Coercion (OUP 2000) Ch 9, 
‘The Moral Community, Justified Coercion, and Punishment’. See also Thorburn, 
ibid 746.  
54 A purely non-distinctive account is that of Barbara Wootton: see her Crime and 
the Criminal Law: Reflections of a Magistrate and Social Scientist (2nd revised 
edn, Steven & Sons 1981). For a critique, see HLA Hart ‘Review: Crime and the 
Criminal Law’ (1965) 74 Yale Law Journal 1325. See also Matravers and Arina 
Cocoru ‘Revisiting the Hart/Wootton Debate on Responsibility’ in Christopher 
Pullman (ed), Hart on Responsibility (Palgrave Macmillan 2014). 
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themselves somewhere in between these two extremes, mixing distinctive 
and non-distinctive elements.55  
According to this article, the aspiration for a pure account is 
misplaced. Contra purely distinctive accounts, the notion that the criminal 
law has no preventative role, does not seek a forward-looking goal of 
reducing offending by impacting on the practical reason of potential 
offenders, ignores the fact that, as we saw in the previous section, the 
coercive power of the state must do more than merely seek the vindication 
of moral values: it must impact on the lives of citizens in a positive way. 
On the other hand, purely non-distinctive accounts fail to engage with the 
fact that the criminal law is concerned with the preservation of valuable 
autonomy, and therefore should speak a moral language of some kind; 
that, amongst the various functions of law, a morally-loaded regulatory 
tool has its place.56 In demonstrating how the PGA satisfies D2, this 
section will therefore show how it combines distinctive and non-
distinctive elements.  
In order to offer a defensible account of D2, the distinctive element of 
a theory of criminalization must have two components: first, it must 
possess a morally fine-grained approach to criminal wrongs; second, it 
must articulate a condemnation of those wrongs. In order to understand 
why a defensible account of D2 requires the first component, it is 
necessary to examine, and more importantly reject, a theory of 
criminalisation that eschews a fine-grained approach to criminal wrongs, 
the public law account of Malcolm Thorburn (the ‘PLA’).57  
The PLA’s justification of criminalisation embodies a constitutional 
conception of the state’s role with respect to the use of coercive and 
punitive force. Such an approach begins with a constitutional conception 
of the state, and then finds a role for the criminal law within that 
conception.58 It sees the state’s fundamental responsibility as securing 
                                                     
55 As Simester and von Hirsch argue, where criminalisation is concerned … “… 
[t]he truth is, we think, somewhere in between.” (n 1) 4. See also T Hornle, 
‘Theories of Criminalization’ (2016) Criminal Law and Philosophy 301, 302.    
56 The expression ‘a morally-loaded regulatory tool’ is taken from Simester and 
von Hirsch Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation (n 
1) 11. 
57 Set out in various works, including ‘Punishment and Public Authority’ in P 
Asp, A Dubois-Pedain and M Ulvang (eds), Criminal Law and the Authority of 
the State (Bloomsbury 2017) 1; ‘Constitutionalism and the Limits of the Criminal 
Law’ in  Duff, Farmer, Marshall, Renzo, and  Tadros (eds), The Structures of 
Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 85; and ‘Criminal Law as Public Law’ in Duff and S 
Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (n 14) 21. 
58 ‘Constitutionalism and the Limits of the Criminal Law’ ibid 87-88. His 
argument is noted by Ashworth and L Zedner in ‘Punishment Paradigms and the 
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each citizen’s equal freedom or autonomy, a responsibility that grounds its 
legitimacy.59 Thorburn explains: 
 
Unlike any private actor, the state claims to speak in the name of 
everyone’s claim of freedom equally. For this reason, the state is 
the unique instrumentality through which we may collectively 
ensure our freedom as independence. It speaks for us all together 
in setting down general laws that define the scope of everyone’s 
freedom in the same way, but it does not speak for anyone in 
particular—and so, in that way, the state’s actions are not to be 
confused with the partisan choices of some particular individuals. 
… In short, we act together with others through the instrumentality 
of the state in order to secure for all of us the conditions of 
freedom as independence.60 
 
In turn, the criminal law addresses violations of such individual freedom 
by others, that is to say it is concerned with identifying those who 
deliberately impose their preferences on others, thereby suppressing their 
freedom: 
 
The ground of the liberal constitutional state’s legitimacy is the 
simple fact that it—and it alone—can provide the conditions of 
freedom for all. On this account, the role of the criminal law is to 
identify when individuals are attempting to supplant the law’s 
rules with their own preferred arrangements and to regulate the 
use of state power to resist such attempts.61 
 
As such, the criminal law is conceived as maintaining, through its 
processes of condemnation and punishment, the equal freedom of all 
citizens. It is the characteristic of being a violation of the constitutional 
commitment to equal freedom that justifies the criminalisation of 
behaviour. Again, Thorburn explains: 
 
… the criminal law’s concern is with someone’s efforts to 
undermine the whole system of equal freedom itself. … Criminal 
wrongs are those that demonstrate a willingness on the part of the 
                                                                                                                        
Role of the Preventative State’ in Simester, du Bois Pedain and Neuman (eds) 
Liberal Criminal Law Theory: Essays for Andreas von Hirsch (n 50) 3, 7-8.  
59 Thorburn also refers to this equal freedom as ‘jurisdiction’: ‘Criminal Law as 
Public Law’ (n 57) especially 31. 
60 Thorburn, ‘Constitutionalism and the Limits of the Criminal Law’ (n 57) 98. 
61 ‘Constitutionalism and the Limits of the Criminal Law’ (n 57) 88. 
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offender to displace the legal rules themselves—they are 
concerned not merely with an injury to some specific rights claim, 
but to the very idea of living together under law rather than subject 
to the wishes of specific individuals.62 
 
The above quotes reveal that the PLA, like the PGA, offers a theory of 
the criminal law embedded in, and thus justified by, a political theory of 
the state.63 As a justification for the use of the state’s coercive power, 
there is no denying that the PLA’s political approach has much to offer 
the impartial liberal. This is because its conception of the criminal wrong 
as the violation of equal freedom is embedded in what those of a Rawlsian 
inclination would consider a political value, rather than a comprehensive 
doctrine. This is then married to a Rawlsian justification of the criminal 
law’s (coercive) power, the concrete realisation of that political value. At 
the same time, Thorburn claims to offer a distinctive account of the 
criminal law, and thereby respect D2: Thorburn states: “Criminal justice is 
not just a policy instrument for sharing the costs of bringing about a social 
good; rather it is an instrument for identifying wrongdoers and censuring 
them as such.”64  
Such an approach is distinctive to the extent that the failure to treat 
your fellow citizen as free and equal can attract a moral condemnation of 
a certain kind. As pointed out by Matravers: “To violate the demands of 
freedom and equality is, for the liberal, to do a substantive moral as well 
as political wrong.”65  However, the violation of equality is too generic a 
conception of the criminal wrong to do justice to the various mala in se 
that populate the criminal calendar; in order to understand why, it is 
helpful again to quote Thorburn: 
 
… what makes all […] conduct wrongful for the purposes of the 
criminal law is that the offender has intentionally undermined the 
possibility of interacting with others as free choosers who are 
entitled to live under the terms of interaction set out by the law. 
He has done so by treating that person as a mere object who may 
                                                     
62 ‘Constitutionalism and the Limits of the Criminal Law" (n 57) 100.  
63 Thorburn, ‘Criminal Law as Public Law’ (n 57) 24:  “… I propose a different 
way of justifying the practices of the criminal justice system—a position I call a 
‘public law account’ of criminal justice. I call it a ‘public law’ account because it 
conceives of the operations of the criminal justice system, insofar as they are 
legitimate, as concerned with the basic question of public law: when the use of 
state power is legitimate.” 
64 Thorburn, ‘Constitutionalism and the Limits of the Criminal Law’ (n 57) 97. 
65 Matravers, ‘Political Neutrality and Punishment’ (n 51) 221.  
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be dealt with in whatever way he wishes. The wrong of rape—and 
of murder, assault, etc—is precisely the objectification of one 
person by another, but that objectification is of concern to the state 
because it is the state’s job to ensure the survival of the system 
that makes it possible for us all to interact on terms that preserve 
the status of us all as free and equal moral agents.66 
 
It is the fact that Thorburn equates the wrongs of murder, assault and rape 
that is precisely the weakness of his theory. Though these criminal wrongs 
share the moral failure articulated by Thorburn (and Matravers), their 
moral ‘wrongness’ is far richer and more varied than the mere violation of 
equality: murder entails the complete extinction of another person, rape 
involves a demeaning and arguably horrific violation of sexual integrity,67 
assault is a violation of bodily integrity. Other criminal wrongs implicate 
further (in some cases central) human interests, for instance burglary is an 
invasion of the legally constructed but also morally meaningful interests 
in property and privacy. Because the PLA is blind to these differences, it 
has a flat and hence distorted sense of wrong done to the victim where 
these crimes are concerned. It is now appropriate to recall Duff’s 
injunction above, that where crimes against individuals are concerned, “… 
what is central to the criminal wrongfulness of his action … is the wrong 
done to his victim.”68 The PLA, with its exclusive concern with equality, 
is insufficiently fine-grained to acknowledge that wrongfulness properly.  
It is worth noting that legal moralism, in all its forms, has no difficulty 
satisfying D2. This is because the fundamental rationale of all forms of 
legal moralism is the notion that a core, though not necessarily exclusive, 
aim of the criminal law should be the condemnation of criminal wrongs in 
their capacity as moral wrongs. The differences between the different 
forms of moralism concern which parts of morality they see as relevant to 
the criminalisation decision and the principles that limit the reach of their 
moralism.69 But what unites them is highly nuanced and developed 
concern with the moral nature of criminal wrongs, especially against 
individuals, and commitment to the notion that a deeper understanding of 
those moral wrongs represents a deeper understanding of how, and why, 
the criminal law condemns them. Thorburn might respond that this 
                                                     
66 Thorburn, ‘Constitutionalism and the Limits of the Criminal Law’ (n 57) 102. 
67 Stanton-Ife, ‘Horrific Crime’ in Duff (eds), The Boundaries of the Criminal 
Law (OUP 2010) 138.  
68 Answering for Crime (n 23).  
69 Where those limits are concerned, for Gardner, it is harm; for Duff, it is the 
quality of publicness; finally, for Moore, it is certain restraining principles: see 
their works referred in this article.  
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concern with moral wrongs is a weakness of legal moralism, not a 
strength. My concern here is not whether he is wrong or right, but simply 
that anyone who takes D2 seriously cannot support the PLA, given its flat 
and monochrome conception of criminal wrongs.  
The PGA, however, shares legal moralism’s concern with the fine-
grained moral wrong against the individual. This articulacy flows from the 
fact that, as demonstrated under D1, all public goods have moral 
character, a moral character derived from their concern with the 
preservation of valuable autonomy. This concern enables a fine-grained 
approach to such male in se wrongs as murder and rape. It was also 
demonstrated under D1 how this concern with valuable autonomy 
articulates the moral wrongs that occur in the context of public crimes and 
explains, in a nuanced fashion, the criminal law’s concern with unjustified 
risk where its conception of recklessness is concerned. As such, the PGA, 
unlike the PLA, is sufficiently fine grained to articulate the moral nature 
of the various wrongs that populate the criminal calendar. 
However, does the notion of maintaining a public good commit the 
PGA to a theory of the criminal law as a pure deterrent, offering only 
content independent (prudential) reasons, in the form of the fear of 
conviction and punishment, to observe its prohibitions? If so, despite often 
targeting moral wrongs as explained under D1, the PGA will still fail D2, 
as there will be no element of condemnation, simply the brute fact of 
coercion. This would mean the PGA would not articulate a condemnation 
of the moral wrongs it criminalises. 
The PGA does not adopt such a reductive coercive conception of the 
criminal law, but instead integrates its concern with promoting public 
goods with the condemnation of the wrongs it criminalises. It does this by 
offering a dual ‘moral-practical’ account of the criminal law, an account 
that enables it to combine the distinctive and non-distinctive elements 
that, it was argued above, all theories of criminalization should possess.70 
The article will now explain how. 
Where condemnation is concerned, the PGA conceives of the criminal 
law as an official articulation of the moral reasons against the criminal 
                                                     
70 Hence Simester and von Hirsch’s phrase to describe the criminal law: a 
‘morally-loaded regulatory tool’ (n 56). As such it offers a hybrid (or mixed) 
account of the justification of criminalisation. For summaries of hybrid accounts, 
see Ashworth and Zedner, ‘Punishment Paradigms and the Role of the 
Preventative State’ (n 58) 3, 5, Thorburn, ‘Punishment and Public Authority’ (n 
57) 15 and A Spena, ‘Harmless Rapes: A False Problem for the Harm Principle’ 
(2010) Diritto & Questione Publicche 497, 506-507. For a defence of a mixed 
theory of criminalisation, as opposed to punishment, see Edwards and Simester, 
‘Prevention with a Moral Voice’ (n 50). 
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behaviour: consequently, conviction condemns those who were not 
persuaded by those moral reasons. This approach also accounts for the 
rules and principles of attribution, as such condemnation makes little 
sense without a concern with the questions of moral responsibility and 
culpability. 
According to the PGA, however, the criminal law is also meant to 
impact on practical reason, with a view to preventing criminal behaviour. 
According to the PGA, it does this, first, by officially highlighting, and 
hence communicating, the moral wrongfulness, the mala, of the wrongs it 
criminalises. However, this moral appeal is reinforced by a prudential 
disincentive, in the form of the fear of conviction and sanction, for those 
who may not hear, or hear as loudly as they should, the criminal law’s 
concern with the underlying first order reasons. The liberal view that the 
law should not concern itself with the moral character of citizens is 
therefore accorded some weight within this conception: if you comply 
with the requirements of the criminal law, the criminal law has no interest 
in why you have done so. The criminal law should be happy for us to 
comply for any reason, including the prudential reasons it supplies, 
because that is all that is required for creation and maintenance of public 
goods.  
However, the criminal law does more than highlight, and supplement 
with prudential reasons, the moral reasons to not commit the wrongs it 
criminalises. It also offers moral and prudential reasons to exclude the 
reasons in favour of criminal wrongdoing.71 This is because, according to 
the PGA, excluding those reasons is necessary to ensure the behavioural 
consistency necessary to sustain public goods.72  This reason generates a 
moral obligation to pre-empt, namely that so doing provides the 
advantages made available to all by the creation and maintenance of 
                                                     
71 As such, it acts as an exclusionary reason, following Raz’s conception of 
authority: see The Morality of Freedom (n 2) and Ethics in the Public Domain (n 
3). See also ‘The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception’ 
(2006) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1003, 1022, where Raz states that “... 
exclusionary reasons do not, of course, exclude relying on reasons for behaving in 
the same way as the directive requires … [but] … must … override our 
inclination to follow reasons on the losing side of the argument. Hence the 
preemption excludes only reasons that conflict with the authority’s directive.” 
This must be correct: the criminal law should be entirely happy for us to refrain 
from acting upon the moral reasons against, say, murder or rape. But, contra Duff 
(see n 52), it should also be satisfied if we observe its prohibitions for prudential 
reasons alone.  
72 This exclusionary power is subject to a limited number of exceptions, when the 
criminal law deems that acting on certain contrary reasons justifies committing 
the criminal wrong. The principles governing self-defence are an example.  
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
95 
public goods, not least the highly valuable overarching benefits of public 
goods. But this is, once again, supplemented by a prudential incentive to 
exclude, the fear of conviction and sanction.  
To summarise, the PGA offers a dual ‘moral-practical’ account of the 
criminal law. For those who already accord the proper moral weight to the 
criminal law’s underlying moral concerns, its existence is, in fact if not in 
design, superfluous, though it serves as a vital indication that the state 
shares concerns with certain values and goals. But the criminal law is 
bilingual: to those who do not feel the rational pull of the underlying 
reasons, or does not feel that pull as strongly as they ought to, it offers 
content-independent prudential reasons to comply with its directives and 
exclude countervailing concerns.  
However, a key challenge raised by Duff is the notion that deterrence, 
the supply of prudential reasons in the form of the fear of prosecution, 
conviction and punishment, bypasses the moral agency of the person 
coerced. As a result, its use does not treat the person with the respect he 
deserves, but rather as an entity to be manipulated by the fear of 
conviction and punishment. Duff believes this problem applies even when 
prudential reasons are combined with, or limited by concern with, the 
moral status of the agent.73 There are two elements to this criticism. First, 
that the supply of prudential reasons disrespects the moral agency of the 
individual coerced; second, that it treats the agent as a means to certain 
ends, those of individual and general deterrence.  
These two elements constitute powerful objections to prudential 
reasons and reasons of space prevent this article from doing them justice. 
The second is the most powerful, and this article will have something to 
say about it in the next section. The first is addressed by the fact that the 
PGA does not conceive of the criminal law as an exercise in pure 
manipulation, but as a dual moral-practical form of persuasion. Moral 
agents acknowledge the role of prudential reason in practical reasoning 
and organisation, because of moral fallibility.74 But importantly too, those 
prudential reasons, and the exclusionary effect of criminal prohibitions, 
are offered in the name of the public goods: as such, desistance is 
demanded not without appeal to a moral reason of a kind and not without 
articulating a benefit to the person coerced. The prudential disincentive is 
therefore offered in the name of maintaining the valuable autonomy of all 
citizens, and so engages meaningfully with the moral agency of persons. 
                                                     
73 See Matravers, Justice and Punishment (n 53) 264. It is for this reason that 
Duff suggests conceiving of the criminal law completely differently, as an 
exercise in the communication of censure: (n 52).  
74 Matravers makes this very point: see The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (n 42) 
82. 
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To express the idea another way, citizens engage with prudential reasons 
as part of an overall scheme of which they are the direct beneficiaries.  
 
5. THE PGA AND DESIDERATUM 3 
 
Desideratum 3 (‘D3’) acknowledges that criminalisation involves the 
exercise of power by the state and, therefore, that any theory of 
criminalisation should demonstrate a coherent understanding of how its 
conception of the criminal law coheres with a theoretical account of the 
legitimacy of that power.75 Some theories of criminalisation believe this 
relationship begins with, and is governed by, the political. This means the 
criminal law is justified in entirely political terms: consequently, the 
approach of such theories to D1 emerges from their conception of the 
state’s nature and role. The PLA of Thorburn, described in the previous 
section, is an example. By way of contrast, the retributivist approach of 
Michael Moore begins life independently of political concerns, by 
offering an account of behaviour worthy of retributive punishment. It then 
only requires that the task of articulating that behavior, and punishing for 
its commission, is legitimately entrusted to the state, whatever form the 
state takes.76 As explained in the previous section, the PGA, like the PLA, 
adopts the former approach, with the result that its understanding of D1 
emerges from, and is governed by, a political concern with the promotion 
of public goods. This section will explore in greater detail the implications 
of this approach.  
                                                     
75 Duff, Farmer, Marshall, Renzo and Tadros (eds), ‘Introduction: Towards a 
Theory of Criminalization’ in Criminalization: The Political Morality of the 
Criminal Law (n 22) 1, 5: “A theory of criminalization must … include or depend 
on a political theory of state and society: it must be a theory of the role that 
criminal law should play within a particular kind of polity.” See also Duff, 
‘Criminal Law Theories’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/> accessed July 2017: 
“Philosophical theories of criminal law, whether analytical or normative, cannot 
subsist in isolation. For one thing, they cannot be wholly separate from other 
branches of philosophy. They must draw, most obviously, on political 
philosophy, since they must depend on some conception of the proper aims of the 
state and of the proper relationship between a state and its citizens.” 
76 Placing Blame (n 52). It is worth noting that Moore’s legal moralism includes a 
number of principles that limit its concern with moral wrongs, most notably the 
presumption in favour of “the standing case for liberty” and epistemic modesty on 
behalf of legislators: see generally ‘Liberty’s Constraints’ (n 43). See also 
Placing Blame (n 52) 75-80 and ‘A Tale of Two Theories’ (2009) 28 Criminal 
Justice Ethics 27, 32-33. 
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Property offences and the public good of the property regime, as 
explained by Raz, illustrate the nature of this fundamentally political 
approach of the PGA: 
 
Every person has … an interest [in the protection of property 
rights by the criminal law] inasmuch as (1) every person may 
become a property owner; and (2) every person benefits from the 
fact that property rights are secure. These benefits take many 
forms. They are not easy to specify exhaustively. They come close 
to being the interest that all people have in living in a civil society. 
My right in my property is based on my interest in having that 
property. But the weight given to my interest, the degree of 
protection it deserves, and the form that protection should take is 
morally determined by considerations which transcend concern for 
my interest in itself. They reflect the interest of other people in the 
common good of respect for property.77 
 
Raz here is referring to a notion that lies at the heart of the PGA and its 
approach to D3. This is the notion that the intrinsic value of public goods 
outlined at the outset of this article, the fact that they exist to benefit all, 
and create benefits that transcend the sum of individual and shared goods 
they embrace, should inform and limit the definition of criminal wrongs. 
The full implications of this observation can be drawn out by returning to 
the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes outlined in 
Section 3.  
It was argued that the difference between these two types of crime is 
one of degree rather than one of kind. What this means is that, even with 
those crimes traditionally viewed as mala in se, there is an element of 
prohibita in the criminal law’s definition of the wrong. According to the 
PGA, this is largely a consequence of the criminal law’s political role as 
provider of public goods, and its concern with the overarching benefits of 
such goods. The explanatory and evaluative power of this approach can be 
illustrated with the following examples: crimes targeting driving with an 
excessive blood-alcohol concentration; the debate surrounding deceptions 
as to HIV-positive status within the crime of rape; finally, the reach of the 
defence of duress. These will be addressed in order. 
The public good of a safe road traffic system, in its capacity as a 
framing good, plays a key role in providing many private and shared 
goods. Behaviour that poses an unacceptable risk to the safety of this 
system, such as excessive speed, driving without due care and attention 
and driving whilst intoxicated, is therefore a candidate for criminalisation. 
                                                     
77 Raz, ‘Rights and Politics’ (n 5) 33. 
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However, where road safety is concerned, the exact contours of any 
offences created, for example the speed limit on any given road, the 
standard of care for driving, and the legal level of blood-alcohol 
concentration, are not, and cannot be, articulated purely in terms of free 
standing morality, for example that it is wrong to put the lives of others at 
risk. The contours of these offences must also depend upon the overall 
objectives and overarching benefits of road use, as well as the costs of 
reducing risk and the collateral effect of criminalisation on other public 
goods. It is these factors that enable the relevant crimes to take their final 
form, and constitute the element of prohibita where such crimes are 
concerned. 
Where legal levels of blood-alcohol concentration are concerned, this 
is illustrated by Anthony Bottom’s analysis of Sir Peter North’s proposal 
to lower the blood alcohol limit for the crime of driving with a blood-
alcohol concentration above 80mg/100ml.78 As Bottoms points out, this 
proposal was rejected because it was decided that doing so would have 
very little impact on casualties, divert police resources away from the 
more serious cases, and even have a negative effect on commerce. This 
conclusion was reached despite a high degree of consensus that driving 
with any alcohol in the system is mala in se, that is to say morally wrong. 
It is the concern with public goods that explains why, nevertheless, the 
level was not lowered. 
As pointed out in Section 3, whether the wrong of rape embraces all, 
or only some, frauds in the inducement leading to sexual intercourse is a 
controversy within morality.79 Nevertheless, in order for the public good 
of sexual integrity to materialise, the criminal law must settle on which 
fraudulent inducements to include in its definition of the criminal wrong.  
According to the PGA, such a decision should be informed, in part, by the 
imperatives involved in maintaining the public goods affected by the 
decision to criminalise this or that fraud in the inducement. And so, 
whether misleading a sexual partner about HIV positive status, a fraud in 
the inducement, should negate consent within the context of sexual 
intercourse cannot be settled exclusively by moral concerns surrounding 
deceit; it should also engage with those moral and practical concerns 
raised by the maintenance of the public goods of public health and non-
discrimination.80  
                                                     
78 A Bottoms, ‘Civil Peace and Criminalization’ in Duff et al, Criminalisation: 
The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (n 22) 232, 261-264. 
79 See (n 20) and (n 21) and accompanying text. 
80 Matthew Weait has written extensively on this question: see, for example, 
Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission 
(Routledge Cavendish 2007). Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Health 
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The above has hopefully demonstrated how a concern with public 
goods has direct implications for the definition and reach of criminal 
wrongdoing. However, concern with the intrinsic value of public goods 
also has implications for the criminal law’s rules and principles of 
attribution. The relationship between the defence of duress in English law 
and the public peace can be used to illustrate this.  
The maintenance of the public peace demands a measure of consistent 
protection of physical and psychic autonomy, through both the deterrent 
effect of a police presence and the threat, and fact, of prosecution. The 
maintenance of this general climate of security for the benefit of all, and 
the overarching benefits it supplies, it is suggested, explain why the limits 
of the defence of duress should not be decided purely in terms of the 
moral culpability of the accused.  
To illustrate, in the UK, the defence of duress is denied to those who 
knowingly or negligently expose themselves to threats of violence.81 If 
duress is conceived as an excuse, denying the defence to defendants on 
such grounds is defensible, as, arguably, they bear a measure of blame for 
subjecting themselves to the risk of the threat of violence.82 But the 
restriction also flows, at least in significant part, from a concern with 
maintaining the public peace. Lord Simon of Glaisdale acknowledged this 
interaction between culpability and maintaining the public peace where 
duress is concerned in DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch:83 
 
A sane system of criminal justice does not permit a subject to set 
up a countervailing system of sanctions or by terrorism to confer 
criminal immunity on his gang. A humane system of criminal 
justice does not exact retribution from those who infringe the 
substantive provisions of its code under stresses greater than 
ordinary human nature can bear, nor attempt, by making an 
example of them, to deter those who in the nature of things are 
beyond deterrent. A sane and humane system of criminal justice is 
sufficiently flexible to reconcile such considerations, and to allow 
for all their infinite degrees of interaction. I have ventured to 
                                                                                                                        
Authority [1986] AC 112 is arguably an example of where concerns with the 
public good of public health helped generate a decision not to criminalise 
behaviour. In that case, a decision not to criminalise, under certain circumstances, 
the provision, by doctors, of contraceptive advice to those under 16.  
81 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22. 
82 See Lord Bingham, ibid [38]. 
83 [1975] AC 653. 
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suggest that our own system of criminal justice is capable of such 
sanity and humanity…84 
 
In the same vein, the Law Commission, in an exploration of the extension 
of the defence to murder, noted concerns expressed by the English 
judiciary that “… the members of a criminal gang might be capable, not 
only individually, but in collusion, of concocting a false defence of 
duress.”85  
Duff’s concern, mentioned under D2, about using persons as a means 
to an end is most pertinent here. The fact that the reach of the defence of 
duress is not exclusively concerned with the moral culpability of the 
accused, but rather the goal of maintaining the public peace, means that, 
on occasion, a conviction involves, to a certain degree, sacrificing the 
individual to that goal.  As a result, he is (partly) treated as a means to an 
end. Perhaps the only response to this is to accept that this is an inevitable 
feature of the criminal law, and that all that can be done is, as Lord Simon 
suggests, to balance the concern with the public peace with the concern 
with culpability. Perhaps some of this negative impact of the criminal 
law’s concern with public goods can be addressed in the context of 
sentencing. However, any theory that attempts to purify the criminal law 
of this concern with public goods is likely to result in serious descriptive 
failures, undermine preventative goals and be overly idealistic, but the 
defence of these claims must be left to another occasion.  
 
6. THE PGA AND DESIDERATUM 4 
 
The above discussion reveals that PGA articulates the reach of the 
criminal law in ways that flow from its concern with the maintenance of 
public goods. In this final section, the article will explore Desideratum 4 
(‘D4’), that is, whether that concern distils criminal from non-criminal 
behaviour correctly. There are two facets to this question. First, D4 
requires the articulation of principled limits to the reach of the criminal 
law. Second, respecting D4 means a theory of criminalisation should not 
exclude from criminalisation behaviour that ought to be included. This 
section will explore these two facets through an examination of two 
examples that test the plausibility of theories of criminalisation where they 
are concerned. It will begin with the question of principled limits. 
The PGA has two features that ensure principled limits to the criminal 
law: first, the fact that criminalisation must promote valuable autonomy; 
                                                     
84 Ibid 696. 
85 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person 
and General Principles (Law Com No 218 Cm2370, 1993) [33.2]. 
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second, the characteristic of public goods as non-excludable and non-
rivalrous, meaning the autonomy they provide must be available to all 
citizens equally. 86 This can be illustrated by contrasting offences against 
the person with the notion of criminalising homosexual sex. 
The ban on interpersonal violence provided by the various offences 
against the person in the criminal calendar enables each citizen to exercise 
the valuable autonomy that flows from freedom from physical and psychic 
violence. This is achieved by criminalising, and hence systematically 
prohibiting, behaviour that prevents or hinders the exercise of that 
valuable autonomy; in other words, providing protection to all from 
violence helps create the non-excludable, and non-competitive good, 
known as the public peace. By way of contrast, banning homosexual sex 
does not augment the autonomy of citizens in any way. This is because 
such a ban does not target behaviour by any given citizen that impinges on 
the exercise of sexual integrity by another. Citizens do have an interest in 
their sexual autonomy and the protection of their sexual choices and 
inclinations, whatever they may be, and so behaviour that infringes on that 
sexual autonomy, such as sexual assault and rape, are legitimately 
criminalised according to the PGA. By way of contrast, prohibitions that 
seek to prevent citizens from exercising that valuable autonomy are 
illegitimate according to the PGA.  According to the PGA, criminal 
coercion is used only to promote valuable autonomy, not suppress 
valuable autonomy, in order to create a non-excludable good.  
Some might suggest that homosexual sex is not a form of valuable 
autonomy, on grounds of immorality.  However, even if this premise were 
true (a position rejected by this article), the PGA’s exclusive interest in 
promoting valuable autonomy, as opposed to suppressing valueless 
autonomy, would mean that any supposed immorality of such behaviour is 
irrelevant to its criminalisation according to the PGA. The PGA does not 
permit the criminalisation of valueless autonomy merely by dint of it 
being valueless: that behaviour must negate the valuable autonomy of 
others, directly or indirectly, thereby undermining a public good. 
Homosexual sex does not do that. 
Attention can now turn to the second facet, which is whether the PGA 
excludes from criminalisation behaviour that ought to be criminalised. Its 
plausibility here can be interrogated by examining its approach to the 
criminalisation of non-consensual medical treatment that heals and, 
therefore, arguably does no harm to that patient. This is the case of 
wrongdoing that is beneficial to the victim.  
                                                     
86 This does allow for some exclusions of a non-arbitrary kind, such as children 
from the shared good of contract or the individual good of voting, see text of (n 
4). 
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Imagine a doctor who ignores the refusal of a patient for a blood 
transfusion, saving the patient’s life. Given the non-consensual invasion 
of bodily autonomy, this example is intuitively one of criminal activity, in 
the form of an offence against the person. It is used to challenge those 
theorists who conceive of harm, in the form of forward-looking losses of 
autonomy, as a necessary condition of criminalisation.87 Given the 
forward-looking autonomy enhancing, as opposed to negating, effect of 
such treatment, it would seem the treatment is harmless, and therefore 
cannot be criminalised according to those theorists. However, whilst this 
is a powerful challenge to such theorists, it does not undermine the PGA. 
First, the fact that the treatment heals does not mean the autonomy 
exercised in refusing is valueless: it may be the product, say, of religious 
conviction, and the ability to put into practice one’s religious beliefs is 
valuable activity. So, the criminalisation of such treatment still promotes 
valuable autonomy. But, for the sake of argument, let us imagine that the 
refusal of treatment is worthless, for example based on racial prejudice 
against the treating doctor. If the PGA requires that criminal prohibitions 
should only target behaviour that negates the exercise of valuable 
autonomy in others, it seems that such a prohibition is not justified by its 
lights, as it only protects the exercise of valueless autonomy by the person 
refusing treatment. This is a counter-intuitive result and, if required by the 
PGA, would undermine its plausibility.  
The PGA’s approach to this question takes a more practical turn at this 
point. Offences against the person increase the valuable autonomy of 
persons, but in offering blanket protection, doubtless valueless autonomy 
is protected by them as well. However, the PGA considers it impractical 
to allow or encourage citizens to decide for themselves when their victim 
is exercising valuable or valueless autonomy, either empirically (have 
they assessed the situation correctly?) or as a matter of moral judgment (is 
the autonomy indeed valueless?). It is far safer for the overall promotion 
of valuable autonomy, including the valuable autonomy protected by the 
public peace, that the criminal law does not allow citizens to so 
                                                     
87 Those who subscribe to the forward-looking conception of harm as a necessary 
condition of criminalisation include Gardner: see Offences and Defences (n 1): 
the notion that “… life-prospects are being affected adversely …” 244; Simester 
and von Hirsch Crimes Harms and Wrongs, Ch 3 ‘Crossing the Harm Threshold’ 
(n 1) and ‘On the Legitimate Objectives of Criminalisation’ (n 41) 378. Raz also 
subscribes to a forward-looking conception of harm: see The Morality of 
Freedom (n 2) 413-414 and 416. This might be labelled the ‘prospect harm’ 
conception, to use Stanton-Ife’s term when summarising the position of such 
theorists: see his ‘Horrific Crime’ in Duff, Farmer, Marshall, Renzo and Tadros 
(eds), The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (n 67) 129, 159.    
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discriminate, as the potential for error by those persons is very great 
indeed.  
Theorists who criticise the harm principle for failing to account for the 
criminalising of the doctor’s behaviour argue that when wrongdoing 
consists in the violation of another’s rights to personal autonomy, that 
wrongfulness alone is enough to justify criminalisation, and so the case 
should be accounted for on those grounds.88 Such an approach risks 
missing the point that the harm principle addresses a central concern of 
criminalisation: the need to justify the fact that the criminal law is a 
creature of the state.89 All theories of criminalisation should therefore 
offer such a justification: it is not enough simply to declare violations of 
autonomy worthy of criminalisation upon the basis of wrongfulness alone. 
John Gardner has addressed this need in the context of the wrong of rape: 
 
… the would-be rapist is a would-be wrongdoer. This already 
picks him out as a suitable person to be threatened with 
punishment (coerced). It is not the job of the harm principle to 
pick him out again. The job of the harm principle is to regulate the 
wider purposes of the law that does the threatening. This law, and 
indeed every coercive law, must have and fulfil a harm-prevention 
purpose. The prevention of offence, distress, pain, vice, or indeed 
further wrongdoing is not sufficient warrant for coercion by law 
unless by such coercion the law also prevents harm.90 
 
The question boils down to finding the correct principle to justify state 
intervention. For Gardner and others, it is harm; for Thorburn, it is the 
state’s responsibility to secure the equal freedom of all citizens; for Duff, 
it is the vindication of moral values that concern the polity as a whole;91 
                                                     
88 H Stewart, ‘The Limits of the Harm Principle’ (2010) Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 17, 33, where Stewart calls such violations ‘juridical wrongs’. He is 
not the only theorist to suggest that the presence of juridical wrongs is sufficient 
to justify criminalisation: see Stanton-Ife, ‘Horrific Crime’ ibid 161. 
Alternatively, fidelity to the harm principle where juridical wrongs are concerned 
might be maintained by conceiving of the wrong itself as also a harm, though not 
of the ‘prospect’ kind: see Stanton-Ife, ‘Horrific Crime’ ibid 159-162 and A 
Spena, ‘Harmless Rapes: A False Problem for the Harm Principle’ (2010) Diritto 
& Questione Publicche 497, especially 513 onwards.  
89 As pointed out by JG Murphy in ‘Retributivism, Moral Education and the 
Liberal State’ (1985) 4 Criminal Justice Ethics 3, 4. 
90 Gardner, Offences and Defences (n 1) 243. 
91 It should be noted that Duff’s normative vision of the criminal law does not see 
it as a coercive practice. 
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and for Moore, it is the state’s duty to impose just retribution. For the 
PGA, as this article has argued, it is the maintenance of public goods.92  
The nature of the PGA is further explicated by offering some brief 
observations on how the PGA might approach the issues concerning sado-
masochism raised by the decision in R v Brown.93 The accused in that case 
consented to the activities in question, and so were exercising their sexual 
autonomy. As a result, the criminalisation of their behavior would not 
appear justified under the PGA, since it arguably targets activity on the 
basis of its supposed immorality, as opposed to targeting behaviour that 
reduces the exercise of valuable autonomy in others. Can the 
criminalisation of the behaviour in Brown nevertheless be justified under 
the PGA? It is suggested that if the criminalisation of such behaviour is to 
be so justified, it should be in the form of public crime. If its 
criminalisation promotes a public good, say a general commitment to non-
cruelty or the maintenance of public health and so, directly or indirectly, 
increases the valuable autonomy of individuals, then that arguably 
presents a (prima facie) case for so doing. But such an objective must be 
carefully balanced, in an informed way, against the value of protecting 
and promoting sexual integrity, both where the individual and the public 
good are concerned. It is only after such an analysis that, according to the 
PGA, the decision to criminalise can be reached. Much depends, it may be 
supposed, on the level of violence intended by the participants. 
Finally, it is suggested that a concern with public goods allows us to 
understand why certain moral wrongs conventionally seen as beyond the 
reach of criminalisation, such as adultery and lying to friends, are 
legitimately seen that way. It is only when moral wrongdoing impacts on 
a public good that it is potentially worthy of criminalisation. This is why 
romantic infidelity and betrayals within friendship are not worthy of 
criminalization under the PGA, because their occurrence does not impact 
on any public good. Indeed, there is a public good in the general 
availability to form and manage our own romantic and other kinds of 
                                                     
92 For Raz, the impact on valuable autonomy constitutes harm, of the prospect 
kind (see n 87): see The Morality of Freedom (n 2) 417 and 426. The PGA 
therefore has much in common with those theorists who support the harm 
principle as a necessary condition of criminalisation. However, though this claim 
cannot be defended here, the PGA as this article conceives believes that valuable 
autonomy and public goods can be undermined other than through prospect harm. 
Also, in contrast to harm moralists such as Gardner, the PGA fuses its concern 
with moral wrongs with its political conception of the criminal law, as opposed to 
seeing the prevention of harm as an independent political concern of the criminal 
law once a (non-political) moral wrong has been established.   
93 [1994] 1 AC 212. 
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relationships. If the criminal law was to threaten conviction for the various 
forms of betrayal that can occur in such relationships, it would often 
remove the element of sincerity that is key to the existence of the shared 
goods of marriage and friendship and the public goods of which they are 
part.94  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
As stated at the outset of this article, for a theory of criminalisation to 
draw on the notion of public goods is not new. The fundamental aim of 
this article was therefore to explore and defend, in greater depth than has 
occurred previously, the implications of a theory of criminalisation 
embedded in the notion of public goods. The use of the four desiderata 
was designed to tease out the merits of such a theory, in the most salient 
and explicit way possible. All of this has been done with the hope of 
stimulating further analysis of what this article believes is an extremely 
promising theory of criminalisation. 
 
 
                                                     
94 For a similar point, see Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law, (n 1) 
54. 
